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valent offer policy. There is a demonstrated need for the imposition
of the Board's requirement, and sufficient evidence to indicate that
it is unlikely to have detrimental effects. Under the Bank Holding
Company Act, the Board is required to make an annual report to
Congress on the administration of the Act.' 25 The Board is also
authorized to make "any recommendations as to changes in the law
which in the opinion of the Board would be desirable. ,)126 It is
submitted that the Board should propose and Congress should enact
an amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act granting the
Board authority to deny applications for approval of bank acquisi-
tions by bank holding companies unless substantially equivalent
price offers are made to all shareholders.
THOMAS J. FLAHERTY
Truth in Lending—Validity of Four Installment Rule of Federal
Reserve Board's Regulation Z--Mourning v. Family Publications
Service, Inc.'—Petitioner Leila Mourning contracted with Family
Publications Service (FPS) for a five-year subscription to four
magazines. The petitioner paid $3.95 at the outset and was to make
monthly payments of $3.95 for thirty months. Thus, all payments
for the sixty-month subscriptions were to have been completed dur-
ing the first half of the contract term.
The contract contained an acceleration clause whereby on the
default of the buyer, the entire balance would become immediately
due. Mourning made no further payments after her initial payment,
and FPS declared due the balance of $118.50. The contract given
Mourning contained no recital of the total purchase price of the
subscriptions, the amount due after the initial payment, or the
amounts and rates of any service or finance charges. Therefore,
alleging that FPS had failed to make the credit disclosures required
by the Truth in Lending Act, 2
 petitioner brought suit in federal
district court3
 for recovery of the statutory penalty for
nondisclosure. 4
The central question in the litigation became the validity of the
so-called "four installment" rule of the Federal Reserve Board's
Regulation Z, 5
 promulgated pursuant to authority granted in section
125 12 U.S.C.	 1844(d) (1970).
126 Id.
411 U.S. 356 (1973). The statement of facts contained herein is taken from 411 U.S. at
358-61.
2
 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1970). The Truth in Lending Act comprises Title I of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. §§, 1601-81t (1970).
3
 Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide 11 99,632,
at 89,607 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 27, 1970).
See Truth in Lending Act
	 130(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.
	 1640(a)(1) (1970).
5
 12 C.F.R.
	 226.2(k) (1973),
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105 of the Truth in Lending Act. 6 In defining who is subject to the
disclosure regulation of Truth in Lending, and under what circum-
stances, section I21(a) of the Act states:
Each creditor shall disclose clearly and conspicuously, in
accordance with the regulations of the Board, to each
person to whom consumer credit is extended and upon
whom a finance charge is or may be imposed, the informa-
tion required under this part.?
The Act further defines the term "creditor," as used in the Act, to
refer "only to creditors who regularly extend, or arrange for the
extension of, credit for which the payment of a finance charge is
required . . ."8 The Federal Reserve Board, however, seems to
have extended the application of the disclosure provisions of Truth
in Lending beyond the literal wording of the Act. The Board's
Regulation Z defines "consumer credit" so as to make the disclosure
requirements applicable to credit offered or extended to a natural
person for personal, family, household or agricultural purposes, "for
which either a finance charge is or may be imposed or which
pursuant to an agreement, is or may be payable in more than four
installments . . . ."9 FPS asserted that it levied no finance charges in
its transactions and was not a creditor within the meaning of the
Truth in Lending Act, and that the four installment rule was invalid
as beyond the scope of the Board's authority.
The district court ruled that the four installment rule was a
valid exercise of the Board's authority, and granted plaintiff's mo-
tion for summary judgment)°, The Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
6 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).
7 15 U.S.C. § 1631(a) (1970).
1 Truth in Lending Act § 103(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1970).
12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) (1973) (emphasis added). Though the Mourning Court assumed
that under a literal reading of the Act itself, Truth in Lending does not cover transactions
which do not involve a finance charge, it should be noted that the wording of the statute is
actually ambiguous. Under Truth in Lending Act § 103(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1970), a
"creditor" is one who "regularly extend[s] . . . credit for which the payment of a finance charge
is required . . ." (emphasis added). However, § 121(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1631(a) (1970),
requires that each "creditor" make the disclosures prescribed in § 128 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1638 (1970), "to each person to whom consumer credit is extended and upon whom a finance
charge is or may be imposed . . ." (emphasis added). Thus, it seems that while the authors of
the Act saw it as applying only to credit sellers who normally levied finance charges, they
nevertheless contemplated application of the disclosure regulations to some transactions in
which "creditors" did not levy finance charges.
It is possible that the "or may be imposed" language of § 121(a) was meant to apply to
certain "open end" credit plans such as the revolving charge account, in which no finance
charge is imposed on the balance for a particular period unless that balance is not paid within
a specified time, However, the statute does not expressly indicate what its authors had in
mind. For a discussion of these provisions and more general observations about statutory
interpretation and Truth in Lending, see Note, 40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1044, 1047-49 (1972),
dealing with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Mourning. See also Garland v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
340 F. Supp. 1095, 1098 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
1 ° Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide ¶
99,632, at 89,608 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 27, 1970).
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Circuit reversed on the ground that the Federal Reserve Board had
exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the four installment
rule." The appellate court found that the rule conflicted with the
Act in requiring that disclosures be made with regard to some credit
transactions in which no finance charge was imposed," or, alterna-
tively, that the rule, in creating a conclusive presumption that credit
transactions in which payment is made in more than four install-
ments involve a finance charge, violated the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment." On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court
reversed the Fifth Circuit decision, and HELD: that the Board had
not exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the four in-
stallment rule.' 4
 Four justices dissented on the ground that the
Court had by-passed the issue of whether credit had actually been
extended in the instant case."
This note will first examine the legislative history of the Truth
in Lending Act to show that the majority's reasoning in Mourning
upholding the validity of the four installment rule is basically sound
in that the continued effectiveness of Truth in Lending in the retail
installment area depends on the rule's being sustained. It will then
demonstrate, however, that the fact that the Mourning case came to
the Supreme Court with an abbreviated factual record (because of
11
 Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 449 F.2d 235, 241 (5th Cir. 1971).
12 Id.
13 Id. at 242,
14
 Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 371 (1973).
In so holding, the Court reasoned that the rule was reasonably related to its objective of
preventing some creditors from evading the Act by "burying" credit charges in the price of an
item. Id. at 366, 371. "Burying," when applied to credit charges, refers to the practice
whereby a credit seller concerned about possible adverse effects of showing "extra" charges to
cover the cost of extending credit decides to conceal such charges in the price of the goods or
services and claim that he makes no charge for credit.
The Court further concluded that the Act's having mentioned disclosure only in regard to
transactions in which a finance charge is in fact imposed did not preclude the Board from
imposing similar requirements as to any other transactions, id. at 373, and that the fact that
the four installment rule may require disclosure by some creditors who do not charge for credit
does not mark the otherwise valid rule with the stamp of invalidity, since a reasonable margin
is necessary to insure effective enforcement, id. at 374.
The Court also held: (1) that the fact that § 130(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970),
based the civil penalty for nondisclosure on the amount of the finance charge does not
preclude imposition of the minimum civil penalty where the finance charge is nonexistent or
undetermined, 411 U.S. at 376; and (2) that the four installment rule does not contain a
conclusive presumption that credit transactions of more than four installments involve a
finance charge, but rather imposes a disclosure requirement on all members of a defined class
in order to discourage evasion by a substantial portion of that class, id. at 377.
15
 411 U.S. at 383 (dissenting opinions). Justice Douglas, with whom Justices Stewart
and Rehnquist concurred, agreed with the majority that the four installment rule of Regula-
tion Z is valid and thus concurred in the reversal. Justice Douglas did not, however, believe
that the instant case was a proper one for summary judgment, since, in his opinion, there
remained a "genuine issue of material fact" as to whether the present case involved an
extension of "consumer credit" within the meaning of the Act, and he would have remanded
for resolution of that particular issue. Id. Justice Powell did not reach the issue of the four
installment rule's validity, and would have affirmed the decision of the court of appeals on the
ground that there was no extension of consumer credit within the meaning of the Act. Id.
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the summary disposition at trial) makes it an unfortunate choice as a
conduit for the Supreme Court's pronouncement of the validity of
the four installment rule. Finally, it will be submitted that although
the Mourning decision will serve as strong precedent for coverage of
installment sales by Truth in Lending when the goods or services
sold are delivered before payment, the Court's somewhat cavalier
dismissal of the issue of whether FPS actually extended credit within
the meaning of the Act leaves unclear the applicability of the dis-
closure requirements to installment sales in which delivery of mer-
chandise, as well as payment therefor, is made over time.
The Truth in Lending Act was passed with the express legisla-
tive intent of enabling consumers to ascertain without undue search-
ing and without complicated calculations exactly how much credit is
being extended them in a particular transaction, and the cost of that
credit, expressed both as a dollar amount and as an annual percen-
tage rate." By providing the consumer with uniform statements of
the cost of alternative credit offers, the authors of the Act hoped to
provide the means for intelligent "comparison shopping" for credit
by consumers."
The majority in Mourning, in upholding the Federal Reserve
Board's action, emphasized that the Truth in Lending Act was not
designed to meet by itself every exigency that might stand in the way
of "informed use of credit." Chief Justice Burger noted that "Con-
gress determined to lay the structure of the Act broadly and to
entrust its construction to an agency with the necessary experience
and resources to monitor its operation." 18
 The Court further stressed
that the Board was granted broad powers to implement the objec-
tives of the Act and to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof 19
It was the threat of evasion of the Act (through concealment of
finance charges) that led the Federal Reserve Board to extend the
application of the disclosure provisions of Truth in
 Lending to all
16 See Truth in Lending Act §§ 128(a)(1), (7), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1638(a)(1), (7) (1970).
17 Section 102 of the Truth in Lending Act plainly states the Act's purpose:
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the
competition among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the
extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit.
The informed use of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by consum-
ers. It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit
terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit
terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
18 411 U.S. at 365.
19
 Id. at 365-66. The grant of authority to the Federal Reserve Board is contained in
§ 105 of the Truth in Lending Act, which provides:
The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this subchap-
ter. These regulations may contain such classifications, differentiations, or other
provisions, and may provide for such adjustments and exceptions for any class of
transactions, as in the judgment of the Board are necessary or proper to effectuate
the purposes of this subchapter, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to
facilitate compliance therewith.
15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).
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credit transactions of more than four installments, regardless of
whether a finance charge was evident on the face of the transaction.
A Federal Reserve Board Letter of March 3, 1970 stated that the
Board felt that it was imperative to make transactions involving
more than four installments subject to the Act's requirements, "since
without this provision the practice of burying the finance charge in
the cash price . . . would have been encouraged by Truth in
Lending. "20
It was recognized, of course, that the four installment rule, by
requiring installment credit sellers to disclose applicable credit in-
formation•would not automatically force into the open finance
charges hidden from view. Indeed, some commentators have con-
tended that there is no feasible way in which to require a credit
seller to "break out" a buried finance charge, especially if the seller's
business is conducted entirely on a credit basis. 21
 However, cover-
age by Truth in Lending at least insures disclosure of other relevant
data about the transaction, such as the cash price of the goods or
services, 22
 the amount of the downpayment and of any service
charges, 23
 and the number, amount and due dates of payments
scheduled to repay the indebtedness." Additionally significant is the
fact that coverage by the disclosure provisions means coverage also
by the broad regulations of the Act which govern advertising of
credit. 25
 The Federal Reserve Board's Annual Report on Truth in
Lending for 1971 (the year of the Fifth Circuit Mourning decision)
expressed concern that if the Fifth Circuit's decision in Mourning
should stand, "many creditors would not only escape the require-
ment of Truth in Lending disclosures prior to consummation of their
contracts, but would also be free of the Act's prohibitions against
`bait' credit advertising. "26
20 Federal Reserve Board Letter by J.L. Robertson, March 3, 1970, in 4 CCH Consumer
Credit Guide II 30,320, at 66,147 (1970) (emphasis added). "Burying" refers to the practice of
some credit sellers to conceal finance charges in the price of the goods or services and claim
that no charge is made for credit.
21 See Warren & Larmore, Truth in Lending: Problems of Coverage, 24 Stan. L. Rev.
793, 817 (1972). Another author concludes that probably the only way under current law to
eliminate the practice of burying credit charges is to consider the practice "unfair and
deceptive" under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions, 1973 Wis. L.
Rev. 400, 421 n.81.
22
 Truth in Lending Act § 128(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(1) (1970).
23
 Truth in Lending Act §§ 128(a)(2), (4), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1638(a)(2), (4) (1970).
24
 Truth in Lending Act § 128(a)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(8) (1970).
25
 Truth in Lending Act §§ 141-44, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1661-64 (1970). Section 144(a) of the
Act states that the provisions of the section governing advertising of other than open end
credit plans apply to "any advertisement to aid, promote, or assist directly or indirectly any
consumer credit sale, loan, or other extension of credit subject to the provisions of Mis
subchapter, other than an open end credit plan." 15 U.S.C. § 1664(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
26 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual Report to Congress for
1971 on Truth-in-Lending by Federal Reserve Board (Jan• 3, 1972), reprinted in R. Clontz,
Jr., Truth in Lending Manual 3, 23 (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter cited as FRB Annual Report].
"Bait" credit adyertising refers to the , advertising of specified credit terms when, in fact,
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Although the Supreme Court's decision in Mourning as to the
validity of the four installment rule necessarily stood to determine
whether or not a substantial block of consumer credit transactions
would be covered by the disclosure and the advertising regulations
of Truth in Lending, the import of the Mourning Court's holding for
the future of general administrative rule-making and trouble-
shooting in connection with the Truth in Lending Act may well be
of far greater consequence than the Court's preservation of the four
installment rule. 27
 At stake in the question of the four installment
rule's validity was the continued effectiveness of the Act's delegation
of monitorial and curative functions to an agency with both the
expertise to recognize possible malfunctions in Truth in Lending and
the manpower to act without undue delay to correct them. Because
the area of consumer credit which Congress attempted to regulate is
particularly complex and changeable, it is vital to the proper func-
tioning of the Act that the Federal Reserve Board be given a
relatively free hand in performing its delegated functions. It is
significant that three years after the Truth in Lending Act became
effective, the Board reported that the Act and Regulation Z did not
yet constitute a perfect set of rules and regulations, and that the
scheme of Truth in Lending had to be constantly revised as new
problems arose. 28
the seller has no intention of offering such terms once the consumer has responded to the
advertisement and is in the store. Section 142 of the Truth in Lending Act attempted to curb
such advertising by providing that:
No advertisement to aid, promote, or assist directly or indirectly any extension
of consumer credit may state
(1) that a specific periodic consumer credit amount or installment amount can be
arranged, unless the creditor usually and customarily arranges credit payments
or installments for that period and in that amount. . .
15 U.S.C. § 1662 (1970).
27
 Had the Supreme Court invalidated the four installment rule, the way would have
been open to Congress to remedy the resultant threat of evasion of the disclosure regulations
of Truth in Lending by passage of a congressional four installment rule directly amending the
Act, though there is, of course, no guarantee that Congress would have so acted. The Federal
Reserve Board had urged Congress to enact a "four installment" provision after the Fifth
Circuit held the Board's four installment rule invalid. Letter from J.L. Robertson, Vice
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to Sen. William Proxmire,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, Feb. 28, 1972, in 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide $ 30,811, at 66,355
(1972). No such clear-cut solution would have been available to repair the damage to the
broad rule-making authority of the Federal Reserve Board that would have resulted from a
judicial ruling that the four installment rule was invalid.
2 ° FRB Annual Report, supra note 26, at 3. The applicability of the Act to creditors who
might be led to conceal finance charges was not the only problem whose solution depended in
large part on sustaining the Board's broad rule-making authority under the Act. Very similar
issues have arisen, for instance, as to the Board's authority to extend another of the Act's
disclosure requirements—that an obligor be notified of his right to rescind a credit transaction
in which a security interest is retained or acquired in the residence of the person to whom the
credit is extended, Truth in Lending Act § 125(a), 15 U.S.C. 1635(a) (1970)—to cover also:
(1) transactions in which a security interest is or will be retained or acquired, or (2) transac-
tions in which the "security interest" is a lien created by operation of law. See 12 C.F. R. §§
226.9(a), 226.2(z) (1973); N.C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 473
399
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The list of courts that had considered the validity of the four
installment rule before the issue reached the Supreme Court is a
short one. 29 Only one case other than Mourning—Strompolos v.
Premium Readers Service 30—extensively discussed the validity of
the rule.
Strompolos involved a transaction virtually the same as that in
Mourning—a sixty-month magazine subscription for which payment
was to be made in the first thirty months. In holding the four
installment rule valid, the Strompolos court emphasized that the
Federal Reserve Board had been granted broad power to prevent
circumvention of the Act, 31 and that in designing Truth in Lending
Congress had, "[c]onsistent with other complex regulatory legisla-
tion, . . . granted an administrative agency the power to apply the
basic purposes of the Act to the everyday world." 32 The Strompolos
fact situation, the court pointed out,
may very well demonstrate why the four installment rule is
not only sensible but also necessary to prevent the Truth in
Lending Act from being a hoax and delusion upon the
American public. Although the defendant contends that it
charges the same unitary price for both credit and cash
sales, . .. [m]erely because a so-called "cash" price is the
same as for a thirty installment repayment plan does not
indicate that the "cash" price does not include substantial
financing charges in a very real sense.
It is most logical that the Federal Reserve Board
would, consistent with its power to prevent circumvention
of the Act and consistent with the stated Congressional
purposes of the Act, plug a loophole by which a substantial
portion of long term credit dealers could escape from the
Act's coverage."
The court in Strompolos made plain its conviction that in upholding
the validity of the four installment rule it was preserving the efficacy
of the congressional scheme of credit disclosures. "Were the Board
not to have promulgated this rule nor the courts to sustain it," the
opinion stated, "the Truth in Lending Act might never achieve its
stated goals."34
F.2d 1210, 1211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973); Gardner & North Roofing &
Siding Corp. v. Hoard of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 464 F.2d 838, 839 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
29 The four installment rule was held valid in the district court's Mourning decision and
in Strompolos v. Premium Readers Serv,, 326 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ill. 1971). The rule was
held invalid in the Fifth Circuit's Mourning decision and in Castaneda v. Family Publications
Serv. 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide 99,564, at 89,521 (D. Colo. Feb. 5, 1971).
;11 326 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. III. 1971).
31 Id: at 1103. See Truth in Lending Act § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970), quoted in note
19 supra.
32 326 F. Supp. at 1104.
33
 Id. at 1103.
3 4
 Id. at 1104.
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The approach taken by the district court in Strompolos and by
the Supreme Court in Mourning is in accord with the practice of
liberally construing remedial statutes so as to effectuate their
purposes. 35
 Substantial weight is generally given to the underlying
goals of the remedial legislation viewed as a whole, and in the case
of legislation regulating business practices, attention is focused upon
the economic realities of the regulated field."
While it is clear that the Mourning Court felt itself duty-bound
to prevent Truth in Lending from being rendered ineffective by
evasive creditor practices, it must seriously be asked whether Truth
in Lending is, in fact, worth saving. Many commentators have
questioned the very effectiveness of disclosure requirements in the
consumer credit field," and Professor Homer Kripke has demon-
strated the folly of believing that passage of Truth in Lending could
remedy all the evils in the area of consumer credit." Professor
Kripke points out that the major problems in the consumer credit
area are problems of outright fraud and deception by creditors, and
that no system of disclosures could be adequate to meet these
conditions. 39
 Yet, acknowledgment that a remedial statute is not a
comprehensive answer to every problem in a particular area and
that further legislation is necessary does not require the conclusion
that the existing legislation should be abandoned.
Not all of the criticism leveled at the statute, however, is based
on its lack of comprehensiveness or on asserted imperfections in its
35 See 3 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 6604, at 284 (3d ed. 1943); Note, 40
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1044, 1049 (1972); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)
(holding the Securities Exchange Act to be remedial legislation which should be construed
broadly to effectuate its purposes); N.C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys., 473 F.2d 1210, 1214 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that the Truth in Lending Act, as remedial
legislation, must be construed liberally). It might be argued that the Truth in Lending Act's
penalties for nondisclosure render the Act penal in nature rather than remedial. On this point,
however, see Bostwick v. Cohen, 319 F. Supp. 875, 878 (N.D. Ohio 1970), where it was
stated;
The court remains steadfast in its position that the civil liability section is
remedial rather than punitive in nature . . . . The court views [the] double damage
provision only as an incentive for aggrieved debtors to initiate civil actions to protect
their rights.
Accord, Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 282 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
36
 Thus, in FTC v, Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385 (1959), the Supreme Court
regarded the task of interpreting remedial legislation of a regulatory nature as being "to fit, if
possible, all parts into an harmonious whole." Id. at 389 (citation omitted). And in Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967), the Court stated that in defining "security" under the
Securities Exchange Act, "form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should
be on economic reality." Id. at 336 (citation omitted).
37
 See, e.g., Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 1, 1-11 (1969); Jordan & Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64 Mich,
L, Rev. 1285, 1303, 1320-22 (1966); Note, Truth in Lending: The Impossible Dream, 22 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 89, 107-12 (1970). See generally Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure
Regulation in Consumer Transactions, 1973 Wis. L. Rev. 400.
38
 Kripke, supra note 37, at 1-11.
39 Id. at 9-10.
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design. Much of the criticism of the scheme of credit disclosures
adopted by Congress has been based on- the idea that Truth in
Lending simply has not resulted in changed consumer behavior,
either because consumers do not fully understand the information
disclosed or because consumers are not making use of disclosed
credit information in reaching purchase decisions. 4°
Such criticism notwithstanding, it is submitted that the Court's
preservation of the statutory scheme of Truth in Lending was well-
advised. The Act has not yet had sufficient time to prove that it can
bring about "the informed use of credit."" The fact that movement
in that direction has been slow does not compel the conclusion that
the goal will not be achieved in the long run. It is to be expected
that education of consumers and changes in their economic behavior
will come about only gradually, and it is too early to conclude that
the effort to induce intelligent use of information concerning credit
terms should be abandoned. 42
Given the direct relationship of the four installment rule (and of
the unfettered authority of the Federal Reserve Board) to the effec-
tiveness of Truth in Lending, and given the probability that changes
in consumer behavior can be effected only over a long term, the
Supreme Court's decision to sustain the apparent congressional in-
tent to vest broad rule-making authority in the Board to effectuate
the purposes of the Act and to prevent evasion thereof 43 is both
predictable and sound. However, it is submitted that in its en-
thusiasm to preserve the congressional scheme for Truth in Lending,
the majority in Mourning consciously disregarded issues basic to the
question of the nature of the transaction in Mourning and to the
question of whether the installment sale in the instant case was
actually a "credit" transaction.
Among the materials admitted by FPS (and thus available to
Mourning as support for summary judgment) were two "dunning"
letters mailed to Mourning upon her default. The letters stated that
Mourning's was "a credit account," that FPS had incurred obliga-
tions in her name by having had the subscriptions entered for the
entire term, and that Mourning had incurred a concomitant obliga-
tion to repay FPS. 44
4D
 See, e.g., Comment, 9 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1020 (1968), in which the authors,
extrapolating from experience with the Massachusetts Retail Installment Sales Act, speculated
that such might be at least a temporary reaction to the Truth in Lending Act. Id. at 1031. See
generally Whitford, supra note 37, at 403-04. Whitford discusses a number of empirical
studies evaluating the effect of Truth in Lending which indicate that, while the Act has had
minor positive effect on consumer awareness of prevailing annual percentage rates, it has had
little or no effect on the relative lack of comparative interest rate shopping among consumers.
Id. at 406-20.
'I See Truth in Lending Act § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
42
 Cf. Whitford, supra note 37, at 431; Garwood, Truth-in-Lending After Two Years, 89
Banking L.J. 3, 28 (1972); Zeisel & Boschan, The Simple Truth-in-Lending, 116 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 799, 828 (1968). But cf. Whitford, supra at 420.
43
 See Truth in Lending Act § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970), quoted in note 19 supra.
44
 411 U.S. at 359-60. A third letter, written by FPS' office manager, stated that FPS
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FPS denied in its answer, however, that its contract with
Mourning had involved a "credit transaction," and at one point in
its answer specifically averred:
Under the contract executed by the customer and Defen-
dant, the customer agrees to pay a stated amount per
month for half of the life of the contract and Defendant
agrees to supply the magazines for the full term of the
contract. At all times the customer has prepaid for the
magazines to be delivered. Under its arrangement with
most of the publishers, Defendant reimburses the publisher
periodically during the full term of the subscription. 45
FPS' pleading also stated: "At no point during the life of the contract
has Defendant paid money to a third person or supplied goods or
services to the customer for which reimbursement is expected from
the customer in the future." 46
 The one affidavit which FPS submit-
ted to the district court restated that the customer who ordered
subscriptions from FPS was required to pay for all the magazines
during the first half of the contract term, but did not directly
controvert any of the statements in the dunning letters. 47
On the evidence before it, the district court stated that the
uncontroverted facts showed that consumer credit was extended to
Mourning and that she received a present contract right—a
subscription—in exchange for a promise to pay a certain sum in
more than four installments. Finding, furthermore, that FPS had
not made the disclosures required of creditors by the Act, the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of Mourning. 48
The Supreme Court admitted that in some cases in which a
consumer pays in installments for a magazine subscription, credit
may not have been extended to the consumer. The Court felt,
however, that summary judgment was properly granted in view of
the admissions that were before the district court and FPS' failure to
controvert those admissions by affidavit. 49 In dissent Justice Doug-
had fully invested in Mourning's contract and that upon acceptance of a contract, FPS acts
solely as financier and co-guarantor of service with the various publishers. FPS admitted that
this letter was sent, but denied that the office manager was authorized to send it. Therefore,
the Supreme Court did not consider the facts stated in the letter to have been admitted by
FPS. Id. at 360 n.5.
45 Pleadings of FPS, quoted in Mourning, 411 U.S. at 379 (dissenting opinion).
46 Id.
47 411 U.S. at 360-61.
"I 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide ¶ 99,632, at 89,608.
49 411 U.S. at 362 n.16. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) states in part:
. . . When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
[Emphasis added.] These two sentences were added to Rule 56(e) in 1963, and the Advisory
Committee's notes on the amendment stated, inter alia, that the amendment was not designed
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las pointed out, however, that the admissions made by FPS which
Mourning submitted to the district court in support of her motion
were not sufficient to establish the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, and that summary judgment was improper in spite of
the failure of FPS to come forth with affidavits expressly controvert-
ing the matter admitted. 5° He noted that the admissions were not
admissions in terms that credit was extended within the meaning of
the Act,51 and that an alternative inference could be that FPS
advanced money on Mourning's account only after she ceased mak-
ing payments. 52 On summary judgment, the materials presented to
the court by the moving party should be viewed in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion. 53
Justice Douglas' arguments take on added weight when one
contrasts the large, detailed body of facts necessary to the generation
of an informed judicial judgment on the validity and applicability of
an administrative regulation with the abbreviated factual record
which results from a grant of summary judgment. 54 The Mourning
Court decided that the four installment rule applied to a transaction
which was arguably beyond the compass of Truth in Lending in the
first place, and which, very possibly, the Court only half under-
stood. The Court had no opportunity to discover from the record,
for instance, the exact nature of FPS' reimbursement of the pub-
lishers, and was forced to rely on the unenlightening statements in
to affect the ordinary standards applicable to the summary judgment motion, and that where
"the evidentiary matter in support of the motion does not establish the absence of a genuine
issue, summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is pre-
sented." Advisory Committee's Note to Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e), 31 F.R.D. 648
(1962).
5 ° 411 U.S. at 381-83 (dissenting opinion). See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 157, 160 (1970).
51 411 U.S. at 382 (dissenting opinion). "Credit" under the Act is "the right granted by a
creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment." Truth in
Lending Act	 103(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(e) (1970). Professor Corbin has stated:
A transaction may be an instalment contract without being a credit transaction
at all. Both parties may agree to perform in instalments without promising to render
any performance in advance of full payment of the price of each instalment so
rendered.
3A A. Corbin, Contracts § 687, at 246 (1960). According to Corbin, then, the key to whether
credit has been extended in a particular transaction lies in whether one party has rendered
part or all of his performance in advance of payment therefor. Id. It is interesting to note that,
given the fact that Mourning had, at any point during the contract term, paid for more
magazines than she had received, Mourning actually may have been extending "credit" to
FPS.
52 411 U.S. at 382 (dissenting opinion).
53 United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
54 In many cases appellate courts have held that certain important issues demand a clear
and complete factual record as a basis for adjudication, and that in such cases summary
judgment is not appropriate. See, e.g., Black Students v. Williams, 443 F.2d 1350, 1351 (5th
Cir. 1971); Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 494-95 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Phoenix Say. & Loan,
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 381 F.2d 245, 249 (4th Cir. 1967) (holding, inter alia, that
summary judgment should not be granted when further inquiry into facts would be desirable
to clarify application of the law).
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FPS' letters to Mourning as to "subscriptions entered" and "obliga-
tions . . . incurred." 55
The Mourning decision will undoubtedly constitute strong sup-
port for the Federal Reserve Board's broad authority to promulgate
regulations under the Truth in Lending Act. However, because the
underlying issue of whether there actually was an extension of
"consumer credit" in Mourning was decided without the benefit of a
complete factual record, the result is a decision that will probably
have limited value as precedent for future cases involving the same
class of transactions—sales of magazines and other goods or services
in which delivery or performance, as well as payment, is made in
installments. The issue of whether Truth in Lending disclosure
requirements are applicable to that class of transactions is bound to
be relitigated, possibly producing the result that, if creditors dealing
as agents in the sale of goods delivered in installments arrange their
affairs expediently, they will be able to avoid the provisions of
Truth in Lending. 56
 If and when such a judicial result is reached,
Congress may be forced to consider amending the Act so as to
guarantee coverage of this important class of installment sales by the
disclosure requirements of Truth in Lending.
Considering the structure of the Truth in Lending Act and the
grant of broad rule-making authority to the Federal Reserve Board,
the four installment rule seems clearly valid. In following an under-
standable urge to preserve the rule, however, the Mourning Court
paid too little heed to the particular facts of the case at hand and
applied the rule to a transaction which very possibly involved no
extension of "credit" within the meaning of the Truth in Lending
35 Letter from FPS to L. Mourning, Dec. 16, 1969, quoted in 411 U.S. at 359. The
financial arrangements between FPS and the publishers are important to a determination of
whether "credit" was extended to Mourning, since if FPS paid the publishers the full
subscription price at the commencement of the contract, and if Mourning would have been
obliged to do the same had she contracted directly with the publishers, FPS could feasibly be
considered a financier, extending credit to Mourning by virtue of having allowed her to defer
repayment of a loan. There was no evidence in the record, however—other than the vague
statements in FPS' dunning letters—of the financial relationship between FPS and the pub-
lishers.
56 The majority opinion in Mourning stated; "In some cases in which a consumer pays in
installments for a magazine subscription, credit may not have been extended to the con-
sumer." 411 U.S. at 362 n.16. The conditions that would seemingly have to be satisfied before
installment sellers such as FPS could be judged "outside" of the provisions of Truth in
Lending would be (1) that no actual performance be rendered by the installment seller in
advance of payment therefor by the consumer, see note 51 supra, and (2) that the publication
service make no payments to the publishers in advance of payments of the same amount to the
publication service by the subscriber, see note 55 supra.
It is possible that the Supreme Court's treatment of the transaction in Mourning as a
"credit" transaction might lead future courts, when called upon to consider whether transac-
tions similar to that in Mourning involve an extension of credit, to label them almost
automatically as "credit" transactions. Such an approach could not be justified, however, in
view of the fact that the Mourning Court never actually considered the issue of whether credit
was extended by FPS, but rather regarded the issue as not having been preserved on appeal.
411 U.S. at 362 n.16,
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Act. The Court's reaffirmation of the consumer-protective four in-
stallment rule can be welcomed as having several possible salutary
effects, The preservation of the rule will serve as a boon to the
aware consumer anxious to put credit information to use in making
purchase decisions, will leave open the invitation to the presently
apathetic consumer to change his ways, and, at the very least, will
clarify the scope of the Federal Reserve Board's authority for all
future courts faced with Truth in Lending issues. However, by
rendering so important a decision on the basis of a fact situation
which is at best largely unrevealed and at worst beyond the scope of
Truth in •Lending altogether, the Court may have left future
decision-making bodies the frustrating heritage of a rule now firmer
because of judicial recognition of its necessity, but no clearer in
range of application than before the matter reached the Supreme
Court.
WILLIAM B. ROBERTS
Labor Law—Reasonableness of Union Disciplinary Fines—NLRB
v. Boeing Co. 1—Upon expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement between Booster Lodge No. 405 of the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM or
Machinists) and the Boeing Company, the union called a lawful
economic strike. During the strike, 143 of the 1900 production and
maintenance employees crossed the union picket lines to work. Of
these 143 employees, all were union members when the strike com-
menced, but 61 submitted written resignations before they crossed
the picket lines and an additional 58 resigned after they had first
crossed the lines. 2
 After the strike ended, the union charged the 143
employees with violating the IAM constitution which provided
penalties (including fines) for "improper conduct" such as lajccept-
ing employment ... in an establishment where a strike . exists." 3
In accordance with union disciplinary procedures, including notice
and opportunity for a hearing, the union fined each of the 143
workers $450 and barred them from holding union office for five
years. 4
412 U.S. 67 (1973), rev'g Booster Lodge 405, Machinists v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143
(D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'g Booster Lodge 405, Machinists, 185 N.L.R.I3. 380, 75 L.R.R.M. 1004
(1970).
2 412 U.S. at 69 n.2.
3
 Id. at 69.
Id. There had been no warning before or during the strike that members would be
subject to disciplinary action for their strikebreaking activity. Id. at 80 (dissenting opinion). In
addition, the local union had not fined any of its members in its two-year history. Brief for
Booster Lodge No. 405, Machinists as Intervenor at 31, Booster Lodge No. 405, Machinists
v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
The fines of thirty-five employees who appeared at the union trial, apologized for their
conduct, and pledged loyalty to the union were reduced to 50% of their strikebreaking
earnings. 412 U.S. at 70 n.4.
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